September 29, 2005
The Quine Ruminations - Reductionism Redux
With yesteerday’s thoughts on reductionism in mind, let’s move forward and take a look at Quine’s paper ‘On the Nature of Moral Values’. The important thing to realize, with respect to this paper, is that Quine is essentially sympathetic to the reductionist philosophy.
This paper breaks down into an analysis of the impact of an essentially reductionist worldview on the nature of ethics. Quine begins by analyzing motivation; why is it that we, as people, perform or fail to perform actions, and what makes us pick one set of values over another? Though it’s dense reading, and Quine assumes the reader has a strong background in both logic and behavioral psychology, it’s well worth parsing this section. He first posits that we have an innate susceptability to reinforcement; that is, every person innately begins to value actions based upon their immediate consequences. The consequence of this is that learning itself is not a learned action; it is mechanical, a function of our biological construction; through inducting that similar actions will have similar consequences in the future, we begin to form the beginnings of a set of values for actions.
The consequence, he concludes, is that at least at first, we value actions based solely on the consequences we observe, and then we extrapolate further from that point, beginning to value the actions themselves rather than the consequences. This has several important ramifications, but the important one in this discussion is that the development of a scale of valuation is essentially a mechanical process that is unique to each person.
The next important part of this paper, as it relates to reductionism, is his assertion that there is a fundamental difference between a scientific observation (”The Earth revolves around the Sun”) and a moral observation (”Killing is always wrong”). The crucial difference is that, in the case of a disagreement, there is a strong scientific methodology for solving the disagreement, while morality relies upon a weaker method of conflict resolution.
The difference can be explained in looking at different types of sentences. Fundamentally, science relies upon observational sentences; that is, those sentences which all reasonable people would agree upon (for example, “This page has a sidebar on the right”). The scientific method, at its core, depends on the creation of a question that can be answered entirely in terms of sets of these observational sentences, with the consequence that all reasonable people must agree once the scientific dispute has been resolved (leaving questions of experimental quality aside). Moral observations, however, have two complications; first, moral observations require special knowledge of a situation beyond observation, and second, the most vital piece of special information (the moral code) is by nature subjective, as no two people have had the same pattern of reinforcement throughout their entire lives. What this means is that, even in the presence of the same moral act, two observers can assign different moral values.
So where does this leave morality in a reductionist world? According to Quine, it’s just about all bad news. With no access to a strong methodology for accessing moral truths, there are two equally dark possibilities. The first is that there simply is no objective moral truth (that is to say, all moral observations have a truth value of “false”). This is, of course, the popular modern position of moral nihilism. A darker possibility, and one that I feel isn’t adequately covered as a possibility by many philosophers, is that we exist in a moral state comparable to our scientific state before the scientific method was created; that is, there are as many moral truths now as there were scientific truths then, and a definite moral truth exists, but in our current state, we are conceptually unable to determine whether our idea of truth is, in fact, the objective moral truth. Simply put, perhaps there is a universal moral truth, and we as a species have no access to it whatsoever, so we make up whatever we want; perhaps our current moral codes are the equivalent of our ancestors’ mythical explanations for natural events.
In the next discussion, I’ll give some case studies to illustrate some of these points more clearly.
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